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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338(a). This Court has jurisdiction over ABC Laboratories,
Inc.’s (“ABC”) timely appeal from a final judgment pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1295.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the district court correctly deny ABC’s motion to
remand where ABC’s breach of license claim necessarily
raises the ‘287 patent’s scope and validity, which are
substantial patent issues and capable of federal court
resolution without disrupting the federal-state balance?
2. Did the district court correctly invalidate the ‘287 patent
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 where the claimed cDNA sequence
exists in nature as an identical and active pseudogene and
the method claim is only an application of a law of nature?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
I.

ABC Laboratories, Inc. (“ABC”) And The ‘287 Patent
Masochistic Indomitable Neurotic Drive (“MIND”) Syndrome is

a rare disease that usually leads to embryonic death shortly
after conception in mammals. Record Facts at ¶ 1 (hereinafter
“RF”). In rare cases of survival, “MIND Syndrome causes
megalomania paired with extreme intelligence, and uncontrollable
urges to make repeated attempts to take over the world.” Id.
ABC discovered a genetic sequence associated with MIND

Syndrome. Id. ABC filed a patent application with the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) shortly after making
the discovery. Id. at ¶ 2. The PTO then issued U.S. Patent No.
8,000,287 (“the ‘287 patent”) to the private institution.
The ‘287 patent teaches that DNA molecules exist in every
human cell and encode a person’s entire genome. Id. The DNA
double helix contains “crossbars,” which consist of two
chemically joined nucleotides. Id. DNA nucleotide sequences
encode information for making amino acids, which are the
building blocks for proteins. Id. The patent also teaches that
different portions of a DNA strand encode for different genetic
traits. Id. at ¶ 3. These different portions, or sequences of
nucleotides, are “genes.” Id. Not every nucleotide within a gene
codes for proteins, however. Id. The protein coding sequences
are “exons,” and the non-coding sequences are “introns.” Id.
The broadest claim of the ‘287 patent claims “[a]n isolated
cDNA associated with [MIND] Syndrome, wherein the cDNA has the
nucleotide sequence set forth in SEQ. ID NO:1.” Id. at ¶ 4. The
claimed cDNA sequence contains only the coding exons without the
non-coding introns. Id. ABC isolated the claimed sequence from
the genomic PNKY gene found in human embryos carrying the
syndrome. Id. at ¶ 5. ABC isolated the sequence by reverse
transcription of the mRNA molecules that create the proteins
associated with MIND Syndrome. Id. at ¶ 6. ABC used well-known
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techniques to make its discovery. Id.
The ‘287 patent also discloses and claims a method to
screen embryos using the claimed sequence. Id. at ¶ 9. The
method consists of extracting an embryo’s PNKY gene and
comparing it to the claimed sequence. Id. Geneticists and
fertilization technicians can then determine if the embryo’s
PNKY gene includes the claimed sequence associated with MIND
Syndrome. Id. Specifically, the ‘287 patent claims:
10. A method for screening human embryos for a PNKY
gene associated with [MIND] Syndrome in an embryo, the
steps of the method comprising:
comparing a first sequence of a PNKY gene
extracted from the embryo with a second sequence of a
PNKY gene set forth in SEQ. ID NO. 1; and
segregating the embryo if the comparing shows
that the first sequence includes all components of the
second sequence.
Id. ABC developed and marketed a screening test based on this
method in May 2004. Id.
II.

The Natural Anonymous Rights Foundation (“NARF”)

NARF is a non-governmental organization. RF at ¶ 10.
Shortly after ABC made its discovery, NARF-sponsored scientists
at Ramblin State University (“the RSU scientists”) discovered a
genetic sequence associated with MIND Syndrome. Id. The RSU
scientists discovered the sequence by isolating DNA mutations
unique to human adults that experienced MIND symptoms. Id. The
studied adults had the exact sequence that ABC disclosed and
claimed in the ‘287 patent. Id. at ¶ 11. The sequence was also
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in the same PNKY gene from which ABC isolated the claimed
sequence. Id. The sequence the RSU scientists discovered
contains only the exons that code for the same proteins as the
sequence ABC discovered and claimed in its patent. Id. at ¶ 15.
Moreover, the RSU scientists concluded the sequence arose
in the studied adults as a processed pseudogene because the
sequence had no introns. Id. at ¶ 11. Processed pseudogenes are
DNA sequences that derive from the same process lab technicians
use to create cDNA. Id. at ¶ 12. These processed pseudogenes are
“naturally occurring cDNA strands in the human genome that are
structurally, functionally, and chemically identical to cDNA”
created in the laboratory. Id. Scientists believe pseudogenes
form when a naturally occurring virus reverse transcribes the
mRNA associated with the pseudogene. Id. Even though most
pseudogenes are non-functional, the RSU scientists determined
the pseudogene they discovered is active and creates the
proteins that cause MIND Syndrome in adults. Id. at ¶ 13.
The RSU scientists then created a screening test based on
this pseudogene. Id. at ¶ 16. The test identifies embryonic and
adult versions of MIND Syndrome. Id. at ¶ 17. NARF made this
test available to fertilization clinics and embryonic testing
suppliers beginning in October 2004. Id. at ¶ 16.
III. The License Agreement And Subsequent Dispute
After the PTO issued the ‘287 patent, ABC sent demand
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letters to fertilization clinics, end users, and embryonic
testing suppliers that used NARF’s test. RF at ¶ 18. In the
letters, ABC threatened to sue users of NARF’s screening test
for infringing the ‘287 patent. Id. ABC and NARF then entered
into a license agreement, allowing NARF to continue distributing
its test, id., in exchange for royalties. Id. at ¶ 19.
The license defines the “Licensed Product” as “any test
covered by a claim of the [‘287] Patent.” Id. at ¶ 18. The
license also states the term of the agreement is tied to the
validity of the ‘287 patent. Id. The term clause states:
This agreement shall remain in full force and effect
for the complete term of the [‘287] Patent unless (i)
all claims of the [‘287] Patent are held invalid or
unenforceable by a court of competent jurisdiction, in
which case the term of this agreement shall end upon
the date all appeals from which any corresponding
order or judgment have been exhausted, or (ii) either
party breaches any provision of this agreement. In the
event the [‘287] Patent is held invalid or
unenforceable by a court of competent jurisdiction, no
royalties will be owed under this license.
Id. The agreement covers the fertilization clinics, end users,
and embryonic testing suppliers that use NARF’s test. Id.
In 2010, NARF sought permission from ABC to use the test
royalty-free to conduct research on adults. Id. at ¶ 23. ABC
refused. Id. Nevertheless, in mid-2011, NARF began offering free
MIND Syndrome screenings to NARF members. Id. at ¶ 24. NARF paid
no royalties to ABC for these screenings. Id.
ABC subsequently sued NARF in Ramblin state court in
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December 2011, claiming NARF breached the license agreement. Id.
at ¶ 25. NARF answered by claiming the ‘287 patent is invalid
and that claim 10 of the ‘287 patent covers only embryonic
testing. Id. NARF then removed to the United States District
Court for the District of Ramblin pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
Id. NARF also filed a declaratory judgment counterclaim, seeking
a declaration that the ‘287 patent is invalid. Id.
ABC timely filed a motion to remand. Id. at ¶ 26. In
support of its opposition to ABC’s motion, NARF submitted a
declaration by Professor Elle Vira. Id. The declaration states
that “nearly [fifty] patent applications [are] pending at the
USPTO, which relate to patents for cDNA where the differences
between cDNA and gDNA are minimal or nonexistent.” Id.
IV.

The District Court Denies ABC’s Motion To Remand And
Rules The ‘287 Patent Is Invalid As A Matter Of Law

The district court denied ABC’s motion to remand and
granted NARF’s motion for summary judgment, invalidating the
‘287 patent. Conclusions of Law at ¶¶ 1, 4 (hereinafter “CL”).
In ruling the court had subject matter jurisdiction, the court
recognized that ABC’s breach of license claim does not directly
arise under the patent law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). Id.
at ¶ 1. But the court relied on Supreme Court precedent and
ruled ABC’s “breach of license claim necessarily required the
court to decide unsettled issues of patent law, which establish
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them as substantial federal issues.” Id. at ¶ 3.
In ruling the ‘287 patent invalid, the court recognized
that non-naturally occurring cDNA is patentable. Id. at ¶ 4. But
the court ruled the ‘287 patent lacked patent eligible subject
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because “the DNA sequence claimed
in the ‘287 patent was naturally occurring and known to cause
the claimed symptoms in at least some individuals afflicted with
MIND Syndrome.” Id. at ¶ 5. ABC appealed under 28 U.S.C. § 1295.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court should affirm the district court’s ruling
because the district court correctly (1) exercised arising under
jurisdiction over ABC’s breach of license claim under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338(a) and (2) invalidated the ‘287 patent’s composition and
method claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
First, the district court correctly exercised jurisdiction
because ABC’s claim satisfies the Grable test. ABC’s claim
necessarily raises the ‘287 patent’s scope because a court must
interpret the patent to determine whether NARF’s test falls
within the patent’s scope. A court must also evaluate the ‘287
patent’s validity because the enforceability of the license
depends on the ‘287 patent’s validity. The parties dispute both
issues because the issues are dispositive of this case. The
issues are also substantial to the entire patent system because
they present a novel patent issue that will affect the numerous

7

patent applications pending at the PTO. Finally, exercising
jurisdiction will not disrupt the federal-state court balance
because Grable’s high bar ensures that only certain contract
claims arise under the patent law. Thus, this Court should
affirm the district court’s denial of ABC’s motion to remand.
Second, the district court correctly applied the Supreme
Court’s holding in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc. to invalidate the ‘287 patent. Under § 101 of the
Patent Act, products of nature are not patent eligible but
products of human ingenuity are. Here, the ‘287 patent’s cDNA
claim is identical to naturally occurring genomic DNA. While a
rare exception, the claimed cDNA is a product of nature and not
patent eligible. In addition, ABC’s method claim is not patent
eligible under § 101 because the claim is drawn to patent
ineligible cDNA. The step comparing the cDNA sequence to a test
subject does not sufficiently transform the application of a
known law of nature into a patent eligible method. Therefore,
this Court should affirm the district court’s grant of NARF’s
motion for summary judgment, invalidating the ‘287 patent.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district court’s exercise of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338(a) is an issue of law this Court reviews de novo. In re
Cambridge Biotech Corp., 186 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
This Court also reviews a district court’s grant of summary
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judgment de novo. Crown Operations Int’l, Ltd. v. Solutia Inc.,
289 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2002). However, this Court
reviews factual findings for clear error. Hewlett-Packard Co. v.
Acceleron LLC, 587 F.3d 1358, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
ARGUMENT
This Court should affirm the district court’s ruling
because the district court correctly (1) exercised subject
matter jurisdiction over ABC’s breach of license claim pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) and (2) invalidated the ‘287 patent’s
composition and method claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
I. The District Court Correctly Denied ABC’s Motion To Remand
Because ABC’s Breach Of License Claim Necessarily Depends
On Resolution Of A Substantial Question Of Patent Law.
The district court correctly denied ABC Laboratories,
Inc.’s (“ABC”) motion to remand and exercised arising under
jurisdiction over ABC’s breach of license claim. Congress
granted federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction over “any
civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to
patents.” 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). As with general arising under
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal patent jurisdiction
exists only when the face of the plaintiff’s well pled complaint
presents a patent law question. Christianson v. Colt Indus.
Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808–09 (1988). Patent defenses,
however, cannot create federal patent jurisdiction. Id. at 809.
In 2011, Congress amended the Patent Act to extend federal
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jurisdiction over counterclaims arising under the patent law.
See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 1129-29, § 19(a),
125 Stat. 284, 331 (2011); see also Univ. of Ky. Research
Found., Inc. v. Niadyne, Inc., No. 13–16–GFVT, 2013 WL 5943921,
at *5 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 5, 2013) (noting the Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act allows “counterclaims arising under federal patent
law to provide grounds for federal removal jurisdiction”). These
amendments abrogated Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air
Circulation Systems, Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830 (2002), where the
Supreme Court held patent law counterclaims cannot create patent
jurisdiction. Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a
Federal Court, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1791, 1808 & n.86 (2013).
Generally, a case may arise under the patent law in two
ways. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1064 (2013). First, the
most direct path is when patent law creates the cause of action.
Id. Patent law, however, does not create ABC’s cause of action.
Second, in a “special and small category” of cases, Empire
Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 699
(2006), a federal court may exercise arising under jurisdiction
over a state claim if a federal issue is “(1) necessarily
raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable
of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federalstate balance approved by Congress.” Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1065
(hereinafter “Grable test”) (citing Grable & Sons Metal Prods.,
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Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005)).
Here, the district court correctly applied the Grable test
and exercised arising under jurisdiction over ABC’s breach of
license claim because federal patent issues are (A) necessarily
raised, (B) actually disputed, (C) substantial, and (D) capable
of federal court resolution without disrupting the federal-state
court division of labor. Thus, this Court should affirm the
district court’s denial of ABC’s motion to remand.
A. The ‘287 Patent’s Scope And Validity Are Necessary
Elements Of ABC’s Breach Of License Claim.
ABC’s claim necessarily raises federal patent law issues. A
state claim necessarily raises a federal issue when federal law
is an essential element of the claim. Grable, 545 U.S. at 315.
Here, federal patent issues are essential to ABC’s claim because
(1) interpretation of the ‘287 patent’s scope determines whether
the Natural Anonymous Rights Foundation (“NARF”) breached the
license, and (2) the license agreement’s enforceability depends
on the ‘287 patent’s validity.
First, ABC’s claim necessarily raises the ‘287 patent’s
scope. In U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray, patent jurisdiction existed
because patent law was a necessary element of the breach of
license claim. 212 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000). There, the
licensee claimed the patentee-licensor sold products covered by
the licensed patents in contravention of the license agreement.

11

Id. To prove this claim, the licensee had to show the licensed
patents covered the products the licensor sold. Id. Thus, a
court had to interpret the patents and determine whether the
products the licensor sold infringed those patents. Id.
Similarly, the license between ABC and NARF covers “any
test covered by a claim of the [‘287] Patent.” RF at ¶ 18. To
determine whether NARF breached the license by offering adult
MIND Syndrome screenings without paying royalties, id. at ¶ 24,
a court must interpret and define the ‘287 patent’s parameters
to determine whether NARF’s test infringes and falls within the
‘287 patent’s scope. Therefore, the ‘287 patent’s scope is an
essential element of ABC’s breach of license claim.
Second, ABC’s claim necessarily raises the ‘287 patent’s
validity because the term of the license is tied to the ‘287
patent’s validity. Id. at ¶ 18. The existence of a valid, and
thus enforceable, contract is one of the elements of a breach of
contract claim. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs.,
Inc., 599 F.3d 1277, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Here, ABC and NARF
contracted around the presumption that issued patents are valid,
Allergan, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 726 F.3d 1286, 1291 (Fed. Cir.
2013), and agreed at arm’s length that the enforceability of the
license shall depend on the ‘287 patent’s validity. RF at ¶ 18.
Accordingly, the ‘287 patent’s validity is a necessary element
of ABC’s claim because ABC must establish the validity of the
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‘287 patent in order to prove the existence of a valid and
enforceable license. Accordingly, ABC’s breach of license claim
necessarily raises federal patent issues.
B. The ‘287 Patent’s Scope And Validity Are Actually
Disputed Because Both Issues Are Dispositive Of ABC’s
Breach Of License Claim.
ABC and NARF actually dispute federal patent issues. A
federal issue is actually disputed when it is significant to the
parties and affects the case’s merits. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S.
Ct. 1059, 1065–66 (2013). Here, ABC and NARF actually dispute
the ‘287 patent’s scope and validity because both issues are
dispositive of ABC’s breach of license claim.
In Gunn, the parties actually disputed a federal patent
issue. Id. at 1065. There, the dispositive issue of the legal
malpractice suit was whether the experimental-use exception to
the on-sale bar to patentability would have applied in the
underlying patent infringement litigation. Id. Thus, application
of patent law was outcome determinative of the state law claim.
Similarly, ABC and NARF actually dispute two patent issues.
First, to determine whether NARF breached the license, a court
must determine whether NARF’s adult screening test falls within
the scope of the ‘287 patent. See U.S. Valves, 212 F.3d at 1372.
This requires a court to interpret the ‘287 patent and determine
whether NARF’s adult test infringes the patent. Id. If NARF’s
adult screening test is not within the scope of claim 10 of the
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‘287 patent, RF at ¶ 9 (claiming a “method for screening human
embryos for a PNKY gene associated with” MIND Syndrome), then
NARF has not breached the license and owes no royalties under
the agreement. See U.S. Valves, 212 F.3d at 1372. Therefore, the
‘287 patent’s scope is outcome determinative of ABC’s claim.
Second, the ‘287 patent’s validity is also dispositive of
ABC’s claim because the license’s term is tied to the patent’s
validity. RF at ¶ 18. In other words, the enforceability of the
license depends on the ‘287 patent’s validity. See id. If the
‘287 patent is invalid, then the license is terminated and
unenforceable. Accordingly, ABC and NARF actually dispute the
‘287 patent’s scope and validity.
C. The ‘287 Patent’s Scope And Validity Are Substantial
Federal Patent Issues Because Numerous Related Patent
Applications Are Pending At The USPTO.
The ‘287 patent’s scope and validity are substantial patent
issues. A federal issue is substantial when it is “significant
to the federal system as a whole.” Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1068.
ABC’s claim presents substantial patent issues because (1) a
judicial interpretation of the ‘287 patent’s scope and validity
will affect these parties, the PTO, and the numerous patent
applications pending at the PTO; (2) resolution of these issues
will have preclusive effects; and (3) federal court resolution
of these issues promotes the patent law’s uniformity.
First, an interpretation of the ‘287 patent’s scope and
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validity will affect these parties, the PTO, and the numerous
patent applications pending at the PTO. In Gunn, the legal
malpractice claim’s patent issue was not a substantial federal
issue. Id. at 1066. The patent issue—the experimental-use
exception’s applicability in the prior patent infringement
litigation—was “hypothetical” in light of the backward-looking
nature of legal malpractice claims. Id. at 1067. No matter how
the state court resolved the hypothetical “case within a case,”
it would not alter the fact a federal court invalidated the
patentee’s patent in the “real-world” patent litigation. Id.
Unlike Gunn, the ‘287 patent is not a hypothetical patent
because a judicial interpretation of the ‘287 patent will affect
the patent and patent law. In fact, resolution of ABC’s claim
requires a court to actually—not hypothetically—determine the
‘287 patent’s scope and validity. See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings
v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 599 F.3d 1277, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(declaring a state claim may arise under the patent law if the
claim requires proving the patent’s validity).
Rather, this case is like Grable where the meaning of a
federal tax statute was a substantial federal issue. 545 U.S. at
315. There, the Court focused on the broader significance of the
question and the Federal Government’s “strong interest” in being
able to collect taxes. Id. The IRS also had a “direct interest”
in vindicating its administrative action in a federal forum. Id.
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Similarly, an interpretation of the ‘287 patent will affect
the PTO and other parties. Like the IRS in Grable, the PTO has a
direct interest in vindicating its decision to issue the ‘287
patent in a federal forum before judges versed in patent law.
See Grable, 545 U.S. at 315; see also Air Measurement Techs.,
Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, L.L.P., 504 F.3d 1262,
1272 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (noting the federal interest in resolving
patent issues in federal court because a federal agency issues
patents and federal judges have experience in claim construction
and infringement matters). The fact that there are nearly fifty
patent applications pending at the PTO that relate to patents
for cDNA where “the differences between cDNA and [genomic DNA]
are minimal or nonexistent” supports this interest. RF at ¶ 26.
Thus, a court’s interpretation of the ‘287 patent’s scope and
validity will affect not only ABC and NARF, but also the PTO and
the numerous patent applications pending at the PTO.
Second, a court’s interpretation of the ‘287 patent’s scope
and validity will have preclusive effects. In Gunn, the asserted
patent issue was not novel such that its resolution “would be
controlling in numerous other cases.” 133 S. Ct. at 1067. The
Court also concluded that permitting state courts to adjudicate
hypothetical patent issues would not undermine the uniformity of
patent law because “federal courts are . . . not bound by state
court case-within-a-case patent rulings.” Id. Therefore, the
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possibility that a state court would incorrectly handle a state
claim was not, without more, enough to give rise to the federal
courts’ exclusive patent jurisdiction. Id. at 1068.
Unlike the hypothetical issue in Gunn, the subject matter
eligibility of the ‘287 patent is a novel issue of patent law.
Although the Supreme Court has addressed the patentability of
cDNA, the Court overlooked the situation presented here. See
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S.
Ct. 2107, 2119 & n.8 (2013). As discussed below, see infra Part
II, the Court overlooked the possibility that an active and
identical pseudogene could exist in nature as genomic DNA. See
id. Resolution of this pure, novel patent issue will control
numerous other cases, see Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1067, because
ABC’s claim requires a court to determine the parameters of 35
U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, ABC’s state claim arises under the
patent law because ABC’s right to relief “will be defeated by
one construction or sustained by the opposite construction of
[the patent] laws”. Excelsior Wooden Pipe Co. v. Pac. Bridge
Co., 185 U.S. 282, 286 (1902).
Additionally, allowing a state court to decide this novel
patent issue may have preclusive effects on these litigants and
federal courts. The full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738,
applies to federal courts even when a state court “judgment
turn[s] on construction of subject matter within the exclusive
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jurisdiction of the federal courts.” MGA, Inc. v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 827 F.2d 729, 732 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see also BlonderTongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350
(1971) (holding a patentee may be estopped from asserting the
validity of a patent that was declared invalid in a prior suit
against a different defendant). Thus, if a state court concludes
that NARF’s adult test does not fall within the ‘287 patent’s
scope or invalidates the ‘287 patent, then ABC could not bring a
subsequent infringement suit against NARF’s customers for using
the same test. See MGA, Inc., 827 F.2d at 731, 734 (estopping
the patentee from bringing a patent infringement suit against
the licensee’s customer in federal court after a state court
determined the licensee did not breach the license because the
accused machine did not fall within the patent’s scope). Thus, a
federal judge versed in patent law should hear this case because
its resolution will have preclusive effects.
Third, federal court resolution of the ‘287 patent’s scope
and validity promotes the patent law’s uniformity. In Gunn, the
Court held state court adjudication of hypothetical patent
issues would not undermine the patent law’s uniformity. 133 S.
Ct. at 1067. That is not the case here because a state court
determination will have preclusive effects. See MGA, Inc., 827
F.2d at 732. But requiring a federal court to resolve these
patent issues of first impression will promote “the development
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of a uniform body of [patent] law.” Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162 (1989). Indeed,
federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases “to
reduce the widespread lack of uniformity and uncertainty of
legal doctrine that exist[ed] in the administration of patent
law.” Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800,
813 (1988). Accordingly, a federal court should adjudicate this
case to maintain uniformity in the patent law.
In sum, resolution of the ‘287 patent’s scope and validity
will affect numerous other parties and have preclusive effects.
Also, federal adjudication of this case promotes patent law’s
uniformity. Thus, this case presents significant patent issues.
D. Resolving ABC’s Breach Of License Claim In Federal
Court Will Not Disrupt The Congressionally Approved
Federal-State Court Balance.
Federal court resolution of these patent issues will not
disrupt the federal-state court balance. A federal court may
exercise patent jurisdiction over a state claim if a federal
court can resolve the claim without disrupting the federal-state
court balance. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1065 (2013).
This inquiry focuses on the appropriate “balance of federal and
state judicial responsibilities,” Grable, 545 U.S. at 314, and
recognizes that some state claims “justify resort to the
experience . . . [and] uniformity that a federal forum offers.”
Id. at 312. Exercising jurisdiction over this case is proper
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because (1) the Grable test’s high bar limits what state claims
arise under the patent law, (2) only rare contract cases present
novel patent issues, and (3) exercising jurisdiction will not
disrupt the states’ interest because Grable contemplates that
some traditional state claims will arise under federal law.
In Grable, the Court held exercising jurisdiction to
determine a federal statute’s meaning would have a “microscopic
effect on the federal-state division of labor” because only
“rare state title case[s]” raise contested federal issues. Id.
at 315. Similarly, exercising jurisdiction over this case will
not cause contract cases to flood federal district courts.
First, a party asserting that a state claim arises under
the patent law must satisfy the other three prongs of the Grable
test. This limits the cases that arise under the patent law
because the patent issue must not only be raised and disputed,
but also substantial to the federal system. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at
1066. This substantiality prong ensures that not all breach of
patent license claims arise under the patent law.
Second, only rare contract cases present novel patent
issues that will control other cases. These rare cases belong in
federal court because federal court resolution of novel patent
issues furthers Congress’s intent to have a predictable and
uniform patent law. See DSC Commc’ns Corp. v. Pulse Commc’ns,
Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Indeed, Congress
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granted federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over matters
arising under patent law to ensure uniformity in the patent law.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1338(a), 1295. Here, ABC’s claim presents the novel
issue of whether cDNA is patent eligible when an active and
identical pseudogene exists in nature. RF at ¶¶ 11–15. Thus, the
fact that ABC’s claim involves a novel issue ensures that only
rare breach of license claims will arise under the patent law.
Third, although states have an interest in developing their
own body of contract law, see Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299
U.S. 109, 114–15 (1936), Grable contemplates that some state
claims will arise under the patent law when the claim depends on
a substantial patent issue. See 545 U.S. at 314. Otherwise,
fifty state court systems could make different rulings regarding
the subject matter eligibility of a class of patents. Congress
did not intend this when it enacted §§ 1338 and 1295.
In sum, ABC’s breach of license claim arises under the
federal patent law. Specifically, the ‘287 patent’s scope and
validity are essential elements and dispositive of ABC’s claim.
These issues are also significant to the federal system because
their resolution affects more than just ABC and NARF. Finally,
federal court adjudication of ABC’s breach of license claim
comports with the congressionally approved federal-state court
balance. Thus, this Court should affirm the district court’s
denial of ABC’s motion to remand.
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II. The Claims In ABC’s ‘287 Patent Are Invalid Under § 101
Because They Are Drawn To Patent Ineligible Subject Matter.
The district court correctly invalidated the ‘287 patent
for lack of patentable subject matter. “Whoever invents or
discovers any new and useful . . . composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent.” 35
U.S.C. § 101. But laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas are not patentable. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012). These
exceptions prevent inventors from patenting the tools of science
and “inhibit[ing] future innovation premised upon them.” Id. at
1301. For example, mental processes, Gottschalk v. Benson, 409
U.S. 63, 67 (1972), and products of nature, such as metals, Gen.
Elec. Co. v. De Forest Radio Co., 28 F.2d 641, 642 (3d Cir.
1928), and bacteria, Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,
333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948), are patent ineligible under § 101.
In Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,
the Supreme Court held isolated genomic DNA is not patent
eligible subject matter because it is a product of nature. 133
S. Ct. 2107, 2120 (2013). The Court’s holding relied in part on
the distinction between Diamond v. Chakrabarty and Funk Bros.
See id. at 2116–17. In Chakrabarty, the claimed subject matter
was a strain of bacteria the inventor genetically modified to
break down crude oil. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305
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(1980). The Court held the bacterium patent eligible because the
manmade bacterium was “markedly different” from any naturally
occurring bacterium. Id. at 309–10.
In Funk Bros., however, the Court held a new combination of
unaltered, naturally occurring bacteria patent ineligible. 333
U.S. at 130. The Court recognized that “[h]e who discovers a[n]
. . . unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly of
it which the law recognizes.” Id. Following these precedents,
the AMP Court held genomic DNA “isolated from the surrounding
genetic material” patent ineligible. Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology, 133 S. Ct. at 2120. Synthetically prepared cDNA,
however, is a product of human ingenuity not found in nature.
Id. at 2119. Therefore, cDNA is patent eligible. Id.
Despite the Court’s holding that cDNA is patent eligibile,
all of ABC’s claims are invalid because (A) the cDNA claimed in
the ‘287 patent is a product of nature and (B) the method claim
covers only nonpatentable abstract ideas.
A. The ‘287 Patent’s cDNA Claim Is Ineligible Subject
Matter Because It Is A Product Of Nature.
The ‘287 patent’s cDNA claim is invalid for lack of
patentable subject matter because the cDNA is a product of
nature. Although the Court held Myriad’s cDNA claims patentable,
the Court defined when cDNA is and is not patentable. See Ass’n
for Molecular Pathology, 133 S. Ct. at 2119 & n.8.
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In AMP, the Court addressed the patentability of Myriad’s
claims to the BRCA genes. Id. at 2112. The claims were drawn to
segments of DNA isolated from their surroundings, retaining
their entire natural genetic sequence. Id. at 2113. The Court
held these claims were drawn to patent ineligible products of
nature. Id. at 2111. But the claimed cDNA versions of those
genes were valid. Id. at 2119. Specifically, the Court held cDNA
is a patentable “product of man” because it is “something new”
and “distinct from the DNA from which it was derived.” Id. Even
though nature dictates the cDNA sequence, the “lab technician
unquestionably creates something new when cDNA is made.” Id.
Thus, the Court premised its narrow holding on the principle
that cDNA is patent eligible because it contains only exons and
is distinct from the natural material. See id.
The Court also appreciated that cDNA patent eligibility is
not so clear. Id. at 2119 n.8. Footnote eight states that in
rare cases, viral infection of a cell may incorporate processed
pseudogenes into the host DNA. Id. Pseudogenes are composed of
intron-free cDNA. Id. The Court noted that in some situations, a
“rare phenomenon might randomly create a molecule similar to one
created synthetically through human ingenuity.” Id. According to
the Court, this possibility does not render a composition of
matter nonpatentable. Id.
This ambiguity and its importance to this case necessitates
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further discussion because 1) the Court intended the product of
nature doctrine to trump the product of man doctrine and 2) this
case presents an exception to the rule that cDNA is patentable.
1) cDNA Is Patent Eligible Except When The cDNA Is
Demonstrably A Product of Nature.
The Court focused on the manmade nature of the cDNA when it
held Myriad’s cDNA claims valid because it was “distinct from”
the genomic DNA from which it derived. Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology, 133 S. Ct. at 2119. To ensure consistent application
of the product of man doctrine, the Court addressed the rare
possibility of cDNA existing in nature. Id. at 2119 n.8.
The Court stated the possibility that a synthetic molecule
exists randomly in nature “does not render a composition of
matter nonpatentable.” Id. This statement allows the PTO to
issue patents where the claimed subject matter’s natural
existence is unknown. It also permits courts to invalidate
patents when later discovery demonstrates the claimed invention
exists in nature. For example, the discovery of a naturally
produced chemical would invalidate a patent claiming a manmade
version of the chemical.
The Court also endorsed Judge Bryson’s observation that the
challenger “failed to demonstrate that the pseudogene consists
of the same sequence as the BRCA1 cDNA.” Id. (quoting Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d
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1303, 1356 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Bryson, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)). Thus, the challenger failed to show
the claimed cDNA was a naturally occurring pseudogene rather
than a synthetically created product. Id. The Court’s adoption
of this observation reiterates the rule that a party claiming
invalidity must show the claimed invention is identical to a
natural product. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a).
Accordingly, a patent claiming a synthetically created
product is invalid if research shows that the claimed subject
matter exists in nature. This outcome allows for consistent
application of the product of man doctrine and comports with the
principles underlying the patent law. Specifically, the patent
law recognizes that “extensive effort alone is insufficient to
satisfy the demands of § 101.” Ass’n for Molecular Pathology,
133 S. Ct. at 2118. Rather, the inventor must create “something
new.” Id. at 2119; see also 35 U.S.C. § 101 (stating that an
inventor must invent something “new and useful” to receive a
patent). Therefore, the ‘287 patent’s cDNA claim is a product of
nature, not a new product of human ingenuity.
2) This Case Presents An Exception To The Rule That
cDNA Is Distinct from Its Original DNA.
The cDNA discovered and claimed by ABC is not patent
eligible under § 101 because it is a naturally occurring product
of nature. The DNA that NARF isolated is identical to the cDNA
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that ABC claimed. RF at ¶ 12. Both genetic sequences are
identical, intron-free, and actively code for the MIND Syndrome
proteins. See id. at ¶¶ 10–15. All ABC created was an identical
copy of the naturally occurring sequence, possibly without even
realizing it. But knowledge of that fact is not relevant to the
patentability inquiry. Thus, ABC’s cDNA claim is invalid because
the claimed cDNA is not a product of human ingenuity. Rather,
the claimed cDNA is a patent ineligible product of nature.
B. ABC’s Method Claim Is Invalid Because The Claim Covers
Well Understood Tools Of Science And Abstract Ideas.
The ‘287 patent’s method claim is invalid because the claim
does not transform the ineligible composition into a patentable
process. Method claims are patent eligible if they “transform an
unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible application of
such a law, [but] one must do more than simply state the law . .
. while adding the words ‘apply it.’” Mayo Collaborative Servs.
v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012).
In Parker v. Flook, the Court considered a method of
updating alarm limits. 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978). The Court held
that no inventive concept supported the patent because the only
novel feature of the method was the application of an algorithm
to an otherwise conventional process. Id. at 585, 590.
In Diamond v. Diehr, however, the Court held a method
applying the Arrhenius equation to a process for curing rubber
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patent eligible. 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981). Although the process
applied a known mathematical equation, the method did not seek
to preclude its use. Id. at 187. Rather, the method integrated
the equation into the process as a whole, transforming the claim
into a different, patent eligible state. Id. at 187, 192.
The Court applied these precedents in Bilski v. Kappos to
invalidate a claimed business method. 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231
(2010). While the Court did not preclude the patentability of
business methods, it held that allowing a patent for hedging
risk would “pre-empt use of this approach in all fields, and
would effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea.” Id.
In Mayo, the Court held the claimed method did not
sufficiently transform the application of known laws of nature
into a patentable method. 132 S. Ct. at 1298. There, the method
claimed steps of administering a known drug, ascertaining a
known metabolite’s concentrations, and using that information to
modify the treatment. See id. at 1296–98. The Court determined
these steps were nothing more than instructions to a physician
on the routine practice of medicine. Id. at 1298.
In AMP, this Court applied Mayo and held comparing two
genetic sequences “can be accomplished by mere inspection
alone.” Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2012) aff’d in part,
rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
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Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). There, the claims
recited a screening method of comparing a known gene to the test
sample and observing the differences. Id. at 1334. This Court
held claims to “‘comparing’ or ‘analyzing’ two gene sequences
fall outside the scope of § 101 because they claim only abstract
mental processes.” Id. Accordingly, Myriad’s method claims of
comparing and analyzing were not sufficiently transformative of
“what was otherwise a claim to a natural law.” Id. at 1335.
Myriad’s method claims were “only directed to the abstract
mental process.” Id. Therefore, Myriad’s method claims to the
application of isolated BRCA genes were invalid. Id.
Most recently, Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc.
applied this line of cases to invalidate method claims related
to fetal DNA. No. C 11–06391 SI, 2013 WL 5863022, at *7 (N.D.
Cal. Oct 30, 2013). There, the claims detected fetal DNA,
amplified it, and ran diagnostic tests on that DNA. Id. at *1–2.
Because “the only inventive concept contained in the patent
[was] the discovery of [naturally occurring] cffDNA,” the court
followed Mayo to invalidate the patent. Id. at *9.
ABC’s method claim falls within the framework of patent
ineligible methods. The ‘287 patent teaches that by extracting
and comparing an embryo’s PNKY gene to the claimed sequence,
technicians can determine whether the embryo includes the MIND
Syndrome sequence. RF at ¶ 9. As in AMP, the only claimed step
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is to “compare” the two sequences. Id. Without more, the method
claim does not transform the nonpatentable DNA sequence into a
patentable application. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at
1294. As discussed above, comparison of nucleotide sequences is
not a patent eligible application of a law of nature. ABC’s
claim does not contain any additional features that “provide
practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting
effort designed to monopolize the law of nature itself.” Id. at
1297. Therefore, the ‘287 patent’s method claim is invalid.
In sum, the ‘287 patent’s composition and method claims are
patent ineligible. The district court correctly invalidated
ABC’s patent and granted NARF’s motion for summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should AFFIRM the lower
court’s denial of ABC’s motion to remand and grant of NARF’s
motion for summary judgment to invalidate the ‘287 patent.
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